

International Journal of Game The Cory ISSN 0020-7276

Volume 15, 1986

Founded by
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Physica-Verlag Wien Heidelberg

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© Physica-Verlag Ges. m. b. H., Schottengasse 7/5, A-1011 Wien, 1986

Printed in Germany

ISSN 0020-7276

Composed by Elsner & Behrens, Oftersheim Printed by Kiliandruck, Grünstadt Bound by J. Schäffer OHG, Grünstadt

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